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abstract
The US Government is moving apace to develop doctrines and capabilities that will allow the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) to exploit Cyberspace for military advantage, and the role of computer net-
worked operations (CNO) has taken on greater importance with the rise of network-centric warfare. 
Unfortunately, extant CNO organizations are slow to anticipate and react, and as such do not operate 
well within their highly dynamic environments. Contingency Theory research provides considerable 
knowledge to guide designing organizational structures that fit well with various mission-environmental 
contexts, and as such it offers excellent potential to inform leaders and policy makers regarding how to 
bring their CNO organizations and approaches into better fit, and hence to improve performance. In this 
chapter, we identify a candidate set of organizational structures that offer potential to fit DoD better as 
it strives, and struggles, to address the technological advances and risks associated with CNO. Using 
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the Organizational Consultant (OrgCon) expert system to model and diagnose key problems and misfits 
associated with extant CNO organizations in the DoD, we propose a superior organizational structure 
for CNO that can also be applied to organizations in the international environment. Results elucidate 
important insights into CNO organization and management, suitable for immediate policy and opera-
tional implementation, and expand the growing empirical basis to guide continued research.
intrODUctiOn 
The Internet has become the new frontier where 
nation states and stateless actors can communi-
cate on a global scale and with a rate of speed 
and security as never seen before. The Internet 
has been operational since 1969 in one form or 
fashion, and over one billion people are said to use 
the Internet today (estimated at 1,407,724,920 as 
of March 2008, Internet Usage Statistics, 2008). 
Nation states in particular are becoming increas-
ingly reliant on the Internet and Cyberspace for 
infrastructure to support economic and security 
interests. 
In addition to nation states, the rise of terror-
ist groups such as Al Qaeda, and other nefarious 
groups such as mafia crime families, would have 
been unable to reach current epic proportions 
without such modern means of global communica-
tions. To counter threats from both nation states 
and nefarious groups, the US maintains numerous 
organizations (e.g., National Security Agency, 
military service network commands) charged 
with the protection and defense of the commu-
nications and network infrastructure enabled by 
the Internet. Indeed, one can argue that a plethora 
of different, often non-cooperating organizations 
(e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central In-
telligence Agency) seek simultaneously and with 
minimal coordination to accomplish efficiently 
and effectively computer network operations. 
This confusion and uncoordination between them 
serves to slow responses to network attacks and 
intrusions, particularly where more than one orga-
nization strives simultaneously to provide critical 
infrastructure, expertise and technology. 
To reverse this trend in part, the US Govern-
ment is moving apace to develop doctrines and 
capabilities that will allow the Department of 
Defense (DoD) to exploit Cyberspace for military 
advantage. Within the broad rubric of Informa-
tion Operations (IO), there is increasing effort 
devoted to shaping the organizational structures 
of Computer Network Operations (CNO) at the 
joint, combatant command, and service levels, and 
the role of CNO has taken on greater importance 
with the rise of network-centric warfare. Com-
prised primarily of defense, attack and exploita-
tion, the technological capabilities are growing 
exponentially, as is the rate of data exchange, yet 
the organizational structures supporting CNO 
are slow to anticipate and react. This presents a 
serious issue in terms of mission-environmental 
fit, as such organizations do not operate well 
within their highly dynamic environments, nor 
are they suited well to the missions and expecta-
tions placed upon them.
A half century of Contingency Theory research 
(e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961; Harvey, 1968; Gal-
braith, 1973) provides considerable knowledge 
to guide designing organizational structures that 
fit well with various mission-environmental con-
texts, and as such it offers excellent potential to 
inform leaders and policy makers regarding how 
to bring their CNO organizations and approaches 
into better fit, and hence to improve performance. 
The key research question is, which organizational 
configurations provide the best CNO performance 
within the network-centric environment? 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify a 
candidate set of organizational structures that 
offer potential to fit DoD like agencies, and inter-
national organizations as they strive, and struggle, 
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to address the technological advances and risks 
associated with CNO. Using the Organizational 
Consultant (OrgCon) expert system to model and 
diagnose key problems and misfits associated with 
extant CNO organizations in the DoD, we propose 
a superior organizational structure for CNO, and 
we outline a three-step transformation plan to 
guide movement toward such structure. 
In the balance of this chapter, we first review 
key background literature on CNO and the OrgCon 
expert system. We then describe a grounded CNO 
organization model specified via OrgCon, and 
depict such model in two, contrasting, network-
centric environments. Results follow to elucidate 
important insights into CNO organization and 
management, suitable for immediate policy and 
operational implementation, and expand the grow-
ing empirical basis to guide continued research 
along these lines. Hence, the potential contribution 
of this research has both theoretical and real-world 
implications, and should appeal to both the aca-
demic and practitioner communities.
bacKGrOUnD
In this section we describe a current CNO or-
ganization, focusing in particular on Computer 
Network Defense (CND) to ground our model 
in current practice for analysis. CND represents 
a very practical point to begin an investigation 
such as this: there is little opportunity to conduct 
computer attacks and exploitations if one’s own 
defenses are weak, and one’s own network is 
vulnerable. We then describe the Organizational 
Consultant expert system that drives our analysis 
of such grounded CND organization. 
Grounded cnD model
To understand computer network defense as it 
exists in the field, we survey best practices via 
published and online references (e.g., see US-
CERT, 2008; SANS 2008; University of California 
San Francisco Medical Center, 2008; University 
of Minnesota Office of Information Technology, 
2008; The National Strategy to Secure Cyber-
space, 2003; DoD IA Strategic Plan Version 1.1, 
2004; DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy, 2003 ; 
CJCSI, 2007; Computer Security Enhancement 
Act of 2001, 2001; DoD Directive 5200.1-R, 1997), 
and speak at length with subject matter experts at 
a major DoD educational institution (to include 
lecturer and tenured faculty in the Department 
of Computer Science as well as Network Secu-
rity Office specialists and administrators). This 
integrated, online and field research allows us to 
sample from a wide range of computer network 
organizational approaches (e.g., educational, gov-
ernmental, business). We build upon such research 
to develop a general model, which provides the 
basis for our OrgCon analysis.
Figure 1 depicts a representative computer 
network defense approach (e.g., organizational 
structure, task structure, personnel staffing, 
technological infrastructure). We ground our 
depiction of this approach via analysis of the 
organization structures and workflow processes 
of a major U. S. West Coast university, and we 
subject such model to face validation by various 
DoD CND experts. Our exemplar organization 
was predicated on the availability of open source 
material concerning the respective CND effort. 
In addition, we determined their use of network 
infrastructure to support research and communi-
cation across a large and geographically disperse 
medical and research facility readily transferable 
towards any number of international, public, and 
private network operations.  Notice that the CND 
organization depicted in the figure includes only 
three levels, and represents a relatively small or-
ganization. Clearly, CND comprises only a part of 
CNO, which in turn comprises only a part of IO, 
and so forth; hence, we focus on a tangible, front-
line organization charged specifically to conduct 
CND. This provides considerable depth of focus 
for the study, and enables us to develop a specific, 
well-understood model for analysis. Nonetheless, 
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our survey confirms that this organization is quite 
typical of CND in practice today; hence our results 
should generalize relatively broadly.  To ensure 
the widest audience, validation of our model was 
accomplished by tenured faculty and researchers 
at a major US educational institution as well as 
relevant subject matter experts.  These experts 
are active in the CNO and CND arena-both in 
private and public practice.
To focus our modeling and analysis further, 
we concentrate on a single yet critical and com-
mon work process: responding to hacker attacks. 
This emerges from our survey and fieldwork 
summarized above as a perennial CND activity, 
and serves to facilitate the generalizability of this 
research further. Our model reflects the steps a 
CERT element (Computer Emergency Response 
Team) deals with the threat described below (US 
CERT 2008 & UCSF 2008):
…There are two methods for dealing with an ac-
tive hacker/cracker incident. The first method is 
to immediately lock the person out of the system 
and restore the system to a safe state. The second 
method is to allow the hacker/cracker to continue 
his probe/attack and attempt to gather information 
that will lead to an identification and possible 
criminal conviction. The method used to handle 
a hacker/cracker incident will be determined by 
the level of understanding of the risks involved.  In 
the case of an active hacker/cracker incident, a 
decision must be made whether to allow the ac-
tivity to continue while evidence is gathered or 
to get the hacker/cracker off the system and then 
lock the person out. The Director of Infrastructure 
and Security Officer or the Network Architecture 
and Security manager must make this decision. 
The decision will be based on the availability of 
qualified personnel to monitor and observe the 
hacker/cracker and the risk involved.
Indeed, responses to hacker attacks typically 
center on one of three main profiles: 1) unauthor-
ized activity on the host system; 2) unauthorized 
attempt to gain access to the host system; and 3) 
anomalies on the host system discovered after the 
fact (UCSF Medical Center, 2008). The model 
depicted in the figure also reflects six CND work 
Figure 1. Computer network operations organization diagram & associated workflow
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tasks: 1) snapshot the system, 2) lockout hacker, 
3) restore system, 4) report incident, 5) follow up, 
and 6) monitoring. Table 1 summarizes the key 
activities comprising these six tasks.
Organizational consultant
In this section, we describe the Organization 
al Consultant, and indicate its potential for or-
ganizational design in the CND domain. DoD 
in general and the U.S. Air Force specifically, 
are in the early stages of identifying the basic 
infrastructure requirements and command and 
control (C2) mechanisms of CNO (Baddelay, 
2008). In particular, the requirement for a CND 
operator to gain and maintain situational aware-
ness while positioning for proactive response to 
asymmetrical network threats points to a need for 
clear C2 lines and organizational structure which 
supports the dynamic operational environment. 
Organizational Consultant allows us the ability 
to use computational modeling to identify those 
structures best suited for a particular operating 
environment.
As noted above, the Organization Consultant 
is a scholarship-based expert system that employs 
automated inference. A huge formalization and 
integration of the Contingency Theory literature 
supports this scholarship-based expert system’s 
knowledgebase. Most such formalization is made 
in terms of research propositions, expressed via 
If-Then rules, which are easily intelligible to 
people as well as machines. 
For instance, one proposition reads (Burton and 
Obel, 2004, p. 19): “If environmental complexity 
is simple, and environmental change is static, then 
the organizational structure should be functional.” 
Here the symbols “simple” and “static” represent 
inputs to the system, and the symbol “functional” 
represents the output. This formalizes one chunk 
of organization theory as articulated from above 
(Duncan, 1979). Other, similar chunks from 
Duncan’s theoretical articulation are formalized 
similarly in terms of rules. Then theoretical chunks 
from other authors (e.g., Mintzberg, 1979; Per-
row, 1967; Thompson, 1967) are formalized into 
additional rules, and so forth, until a substantial 
segment of the Contingency Theory literature is 
captured in the knowledgebase. For the interested 
reader this knowledgebase building process is 
described in Baligh et all (1993).   The validation 
and refinement process used for the Organizational 
Consultant’s knowledgebase relied on information 
obtained from twenty two case studies, consul-
Work Task Activities
Snapshot the System Make copies of all audit trail information such as system log files, the root history files, and like tasks, 
and get a listing of all active network connections.
Lockout the Hacker Kill all active processes for the hacker/cracker, and remove any files or programs that may have been 
left on the system. Change passwords for any accounts that were accessed by the hacker/cracker.
Restore the System Restore the system to a normal stage. Restore any data or files that the hacker/cracker may have 
modified. Install patches or fixes to close any security vulnerabilities that the hacker/cracker may have 
exploited. Log all actions taken to restore the system to a normal state in a logbook.
Report the Incident The incident should be reported following the security incident reporting procedures.
Follow Up  After the investigation, a short report describing the incident and actions that were taken should be 
documented and distributed to the appropriate personnel.
Monitoring There are no set procedures for monitoring the activity of a hacker. However, monitored information 
should be reported in a written log. Each incident will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The person 
authorizing the monitoring activity should provide direction to those doing the monitoring. Once the 
decision has been made to cease monitoring the hacker’s activities and have him removed from the 
system, the steps outlined previously (i.e., Removal of Hacker/Cracker) are followed.
Table 1. CND work tasks and activities
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tation with executives in telecommunications, 
pharmaceutical, manufacturing, retailing firms 
and others, dialogue with experts, and finally 
approximately 150 executive MBA (Master’s 
program in Business Administration) students’ 
assignments in an organizational design course, 
where the students were asked to apply Organi-
zational Consultant to their organization (Carley 
and Prietula 1994). 
Clearly not all authors from the organization 
studies literature agree with one another. Hence, 
many theoretical chunks are mutually inconsis-
tent. The expert system uses the approach certainty 
factors to integrate such diverse and possibly 
conflicting theoretical chunks. This approach 
assigns confidence values to various propositions 
in the knowledgebase, values that are combined 
algorithmically to determine a composite level of 
confidence in a particular chunk. For instance, if 
two authors with propositions in the system agree 
with one another but a third one disagrees, one 
might expect to see a certainty factor of 0.67 (i.e., 
two-thirds) associated with the proposition. The 
second use of the certainty factors is to refer to 
the relative strength of the various contingency 
factors based on the examined organization. For 
example if the modeler believes that the decen-
tralized structure of the examined organization is 
more important than its strategic type, different 
certainty factors can be used to reflect their rela-
tive strength. This represents a long-standing and 
effective approach to knowledge integration in 
expert systems (Carley and Prietula 1994). In our 
research, we kept the certainty factors constant 
(1.00) in order to avoid unnecessary complexity 
and eliminate any future concerns that the values 
of the certainty factors have in fact great influence 
on the output of the expert system. Therefore, 
the use of a fixed value for the certainty factors 
eliminates any bias and subjectivity unintention-
ally introduced by the researcher and any future 
disagreement among experts about the relative 
value of specific certainty factors.  
Operationally, the Organizational Consultant 
takes as input description of an organization in 
terms of six dimensions (i.e., management and 
leadership style, organizational climate, size, 
environment, technology, strategy). The expert 
system asks a number of questions to gather inputs 
in each area. In the area concerning management 
style, questions pertain to organizational charac-
teristics such as: top management involvement in 
data gathering and interpretation; top management 
control over decision-making; top management 
preferences in terms of pro-activity, risk-aversion 
and control; middle management control over 
budgets, rewards, hiring and unit evaluation; 
and others. In the area concerning organization 
climate, questions pertain to characteristics such 
as: interpersonal trust, sharing and openness; 
intra-organizational conflict, disagreement and 
friction; employee morale, confidence and enthu-
siasm; resistance to change; leader credibility; and 
others. Inputs such as these involve judgment and 
interpretation on the part of the person answering 
the Organizational Consultant’s questions. 
Size and ownership questions are more objec-
tive than those above are. For instance, size is 
measured principally by the number of employees; 
the age of the organization is selected from among 
multiple descriptive categories (e.g., new, mature); 
and the organization’s establishment as a public or 
private enterprise is input. These represent factual 
questions. Questions pertaining to technology are 
similar but require some additional judgment. For 
instance, the user must determine whether the 
primary outputs are products or services; whether 
the technology involves mass production, automa-
tion, specialized customization, or some other; 
how routine (e.g., analyzable, with few exceptions) 
the technology is; how divisible (e.g., involving 
decomposable tasks) the work is; the extent of 
information systems use; and others.
Arguably, questions pertaining to the organi-
zational environment and strategy fall somewhere 
in between those above in terms of judgment 
required to answer them. In the area concerning 
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environment, questions pertain to characteristics 
such as: environmental complexity, uncertainty, 
equivocally, hostility, and others. In the area 
concerning strategy, questions pertain to charac-
teristics such as: capital requirements; product and 
process innovation; concern for quality; relative 
price level; and others.
The Organizational Consultant uses inputs 
gathered through such questions and answers to 
drive a matching process with its myriad propo-
sitional rules and confidence factors. Through 
the analytical lens of Contingency Theory, it uses 
evaluation criteria (e.g., effectiveness, efficiency, 
viability) to assess the organization’s fit in terms 
of these inputs as well as an overall assessment 
of appropriateness in terms of its mission and 
environment. In a natural language format, it as-
sociates user inputs with theory through a series 
of classifications. For instance, it may characterize 
an organization as “small” or “large” based on 
the number of employees and the nature of their 
professionalism. Such classifications are rooted 
in organization theory. As another instance, it 
may characterize an organization as having an 
“internal process climate” or “developmental 
climate” based on answers to the user’s answers 
provided to questions about organizational cli-
mate. As above, such classifications are rooted 
in organization theory. Theory rooted classifica-
tions in the other areas are provided as well in 
similar fashion.
Where potential misfits are diagnosed, the 
Organizational Consultant also provides relatively 
fine-grain, contextualized recommendations for 
improving fit through different organizational de-
sign alternatives. For instance, it may classify the 
organization as pursuing a “Defender” strategy, 
but recommend that an alternate strategy such as 
“Analyzer” appears to be more appropriate. As 
another instance, it may recommend restructur-
ing a “Machine Bureaucracy” along the lines of 
an alternate organizational form such as “Func-
tional Configuration,” and it may suggest other 
structural changes such as decreasing the degree 
of horizontal differentiation, formalization and 
centralization. Where multiple recommendations 
are suggested by the expert system rules and auto-
mated inference, it will list each recommendation 
separately, along with the corresponding certainty 
factor as an estimate of relative confidence, and 
explain the characteristics and implications of 
each. This section on diagnosed misfits and 
recommendations can be empty or very long, 
depending upon how well the organizational 
design appears to be appropriate for its mission 
and environment. This approach is quite novel in 
the domain of CNO research.
As with any computer-based system, the 
Organizational Consultant can be run multiple 
times for sensitivity analysis. This helps the 
user to gauge the degree to which one or more 
particular inputs may be driving the system’s clas-
sifications, diagnoses and recommendations. To 
a large extent, this system is relatively robust to 
small changes in inputs. The inclusion of multiple 
conclusions and certainty factors augments such 
robustness. However, as with any computer-based 
system—particularly one that utilizes automated 
inference—problematic or erroneous inputs will 
guarantee problematic or erroneous outputs. Pru-
dent modeling procedure calls for users to validate 
the accuracy and fidelity of their inputs.
OrGcOn cnD mODel 
 
Building upon our discussion above, along with 
prior research (e.g. see Nissen, 2005), we use the 
OrgCon expert system environment to represent 
the structure and behavior of the grounded CND 
model from above. This analysis takes two steps. 
We analyze first the current organization in terms 
of a mission-environmental scenario labeled 
“Simple Environment.” This is used to character-
ize the environment where largely amateur hacker 
attacks target known network vulnerabilities, and 
which can be countered principally via the use of 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that exist 
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within the organization. This represents the nature 
of CND organizations’ routine work, and provides 
an understandable baseline for comparison. 
Then we analyze this same, grounded organi-
zation in a different scenario labeled “Complex 
Environment.” This is used to characterize an 
environment where largely professional hacker 
attacks target unknown network vulnerabilities, 
which are much less likely to be countered ef-
fectively via solely SOPs as above. Although less 
common than the kinds of amateur attacks cor-
responding to the simple environment, defending 
the network effectively in this latter case is criti-
cal, as professional hackers can cause crippling 
damage if left unthwarted.
There is no doubt that there is middle ground 
between the two extreme cases that have been 
chosen for our research. There are two main 
reasons why this approach was followed. The 
first reason is that by examining the extremes the 
similarities and the differences are maximized, 
therefore can be identified and analyzed by the 
researcher with greater confidence. The second 
reason is that in order to examine a case that is 
in fact a hybrid of extreme cases one must first 
understand and analyze these extremes before 
examining the middle ground between them.       
simple environment: amateur 
hacker attack scenarios
This scenario conceives of the current CND or-
ganization that operates in a simple environment 
with relatively low levels of uncertainty and hos-
tility. Following our discussion of OrgCon inputs 
above, six key aspects of the CND organization are 
addressed to instantiate a model: 1) organization 
size, 2) climate, 3) management style, 4) strategy, 
5) organizational characteristics, and 6) technol-
ogy. A detailed summary of OrgCon inputs and 
outputs is included in Appendix A.
Regarding size, the CND organization is mod-
eled via OrgCon as “medium size,” reflecting the 
25 employees in our grounded model. Also, the 
level of professionalism is very high in the CND 
team. This reflects not only ubiquitous college 
degrees among organization members but also 
the considerable formal training received by ev-
eryone inside the organization, and is consistent 
with the highly specialized jobs of people that 
work within the CND arena. 
In terms of climate, the CND team is classified 
by OrgCon as having “internal process climate.” 
This is consistent with the considerable work for-
malization, structure, procedure, formality, and 
policy guidance employed in the CND organiza-
tion. The employees’ morale and the high leader 
credibility suggest aspects of a “group” climate 
also, but several attributes of a “group” climate 
do not appear to match well with our grounded 
CND organization. The “group” climate is “a 
friendly place to work where people share a lot 
of themselves; success is defined in terms of sen-
sitivity to customers and concern for people; and 
the organization places a premium on teamwork, 
participation, and consensus.” which does not 
portrait the climate of a CND organization. 
The management style is classified as one of 
medium preference for “micro-involvement,” 
because management has both a short-time and 
long-term horizon when making decisions when 
countering hacker attacks. The management of 
CND prefers taking actions on some decisions 
and being reactive toward others. The fact that 
management is risk averse and prefers using 
control to coordinate activities leads it toward a 
moderate preference for micro-involvement.
  The strategy categories derive from Miles 
and Snow (1978), and include colorful terms such 
as Prospector, Defender, Analyzer and Reactor 
and are summarized in Table 2.An analyzer 
with innovation strategy appears to fit the CND 
organization well, and is a combination of the 
“Defender” and the “Prospector” strategies. A 
concern for high quality, moderate preference 
for micro-involvement and influence, and control 
over current operations all point to the analyzer 
with innovation strategy.
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Current organizational characteristics are 
driven by organizational differentiation, cen-
tralization and formalization. Differentiation has 
three components: horizontal, vertical and spatial. 
These three components of differentiation reflect, 
respectively: 1) breadth of organizational tasks 
and jobs, 2) number of hierarchical levels, and 3) 
geographical distribution of operations. Central-
ization pertains to information flows and decision 
rights being concentrated in the leadership at the 
organization’s center. Formalization pertains to 
the level of standardization of work processes and 
written procedures to specify and govern work 
behavior and performance. These descriptors 
appear to fit the CND organization well. 
Finally, technology refers to how the organi-
zation transforms inputs into outputs. The CND 
organization is characterized first as a service (i.e., 
not a product organization). CND does not pro-
duce products as manufacturing firms do. Rather 
it performs valuable services by defending the 
networks from hacker attacks. The current CND 
organization technology is characterized also as 
standard, high-volume. This reflects the high 
degree of standardization in terms of computers, 
procedures, organizations, training, personnel and 
other aspects of CND, along with the high volume 
of attacks experienced by the organization. The 
CND technology is characterized further as semi-
routine, reflecting the analyzability of work and 
predictability of associated outcomes, and is char-
acterized also as semi-divisible, which pertains to 
the decomposability of work tasks into discrete 
and independent components. CND technology is 
characterized further as strong dominant, which 
refers to the sophisticated, capital-intensive net-
works and systems used for CND. 
complex environment: Professional 
hacker attack scenarios
This scenario projects the grounded CND or-
ganization forward into a highly unstable and 
unpredictable environment where the organization 
has to counter professional hackers. As above, a 
detailed summary of OrgCon inputs and outputs 
is included in Appendix B.
Strategy Categories Description
Prospector An organization that almost continually searches for market opportunities and regularly experiments 
with potential responses to emerging environmental trends. Thus, the organization often is the creator of 
change and uncertainty to which its competitors must respond. However, because of its strong concern 
for product and market innovation, it usually is not completely efficient. 
Defender An organization that has a narrow product market domain. Top managers in this type of organization 
are highly expert in their organization’s limited area of operation but do not tend to search outside their 
domains for new opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organizations seldom need to make 
major adjustments in their technology, structure, or methods of operation. Instead, they devote primary 
attention to improving the efficiency of their existing operations.
Analyzer with innovation An organization that combines the strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into the 
production of a new product or enters a new market after viability has been shown. But contrary to an 
analyzer without innovation, it does have innovations that run concurrently with the regular production. 
It has a dual technology core. 
Analyzer without innovation An organization whose goal is to move into new products or new markets only after their viability has 
been shown yet maintains an emphasis on its ongoing products. It has limited innovation related to the 
production process and generally not the product. 
Reactor An organization in which top management frequently perceives change and uncertainty occurring in 
their organizational environments but are unable to respond effectively. Because this type of organization 
lacks a consistent strategy or structure relationship, it seldom makes adjustment of any sort until forced 
to do so by environmental procedures.  
Table 2. The miles and snow strategy categories (adapted by Burton and Obel 1998)
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With this Complex Environment scenario, all 
inputs to characterize the CND organization are 
the same as those above in the Simple Environment 
scenario except for those that refer specifically to 
the environment. As in a laboratory experiment, 
we hold constant the grounded CND organization, 
but vary systematically the nature of its environ-
ment. In other words, the same CND organization 
as described and analyzed above is assessed in a 
different environmental context.
The inputs that differ from above are the four 
for the environmental category. In the previous 
scenario: 1) simple environment, 2) with low level 
of uncertainty 3) and equivocality, 4) within a low 
hostility environment. In the current scenario: 
1) complex environment, 2) with high levels of 
uncertainty 3) and equivocality, 4) within an 
extremely hostile environment. 
resUlts
In this section, we present and discuss results of 
the OrgCon analysis. We begin by summarizing 
results for the simple and complex environments 
modeled above, and then proceed to induce a set 
of organizational design requirements for CND 
in both environments. We conclude by mapping a 
preliminary transformation plan for the grounded 
CND organization to follow.
simple environment
Based upon the model instantiated above, OrgCon 
draws upon its codified organizational design 
expertise to diagnose the misfits and recommend 
transformations to our grounded CND organiza-
tion. The three such misfits and recommendations 
are summarized in Table 3.
First, OrgCon summarizes perceived situation 
misfits: aspects of the CND organization that do 
not appear to fit well with its environment. The 
analyzer with innovation strategy is questioned 
first as a possible misfit, because of the few dif-
ferent factors in the environment that affect the 
CND organization, the low equivocality of CND’s 
environment, and the internal process climate. An 
analyzer without innovation or a defender strategy 
is suggested as an alternate approach. 
Second, OrgCon recommends that the most 
likely structure to fit the situation best is a func-
tional configuration. A functional organization 
reflects unit grouping by functional specialization 
(e.g., computer operations, network administra-
tion, user support). The proposed configuration 
is functional because the equivocality of CND’s 
environment is not high, the environmental 
complexity is low, the environment is not highly 
uncertain, and the organization has an internal 
process climate. This configuration is feasible 
for a CND team since units based on functional 
specialization can counter hacker attacks (i.e. 
Block Hacker Team, Restore System Team, and 
Monitoring Team). 
Third, OrgCon recommends that organiza-
tional formalization should be medium instead 
of high. It makes this recommendation, because 
there should be some formalization between the 
organizational units, but less formalization within 
the units due to the high professionalization. 
Medium size organizations and organizations 
with medium-routine technology should have 
medium formalization. Medium formalization 














Formalization High formalization Medium formalization
Table 3. OrgCon diagnosis of CND organization 
in simple environment
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management’s preference for micro-involvement 
is medium also. 
Based upon the diagnosis, we rerun the OrgCon 
CND Organization – Simple Environment model 
to reflect the three recommendations summarized 
in Table 3. This is essentially a test to see whether 
OrgCon’s recommendations are stable; that is, 
whether OrgCon will diagnose additional misfits 
even after making its recommended changes. In 
this situation, the recommendations are stable 
indeed, and OrgCon diagnoses no additional 
organizational misfits. For the interested reader, 
precise variable manipulations are mentioned in 
Appendix C. Hence, after altering the OrgCon 
model to reflect its recommendations—and thus 
obviate its prior misfits—we establish a CND 
organization reflecting good fit with its simple 
environment, and the organizational leader or 
manager has an operationalized set of steps that 
can be taken to improve the CND organization. 
complex environment
As for the simple environment, based upon the 
model instantiated above, OrgCon draws upon 
its codified organizational design expertise to 
diagnose the misfits and recommend transforma-
tions to our grounded CND organization. The 
seven such misfits and recommendations are 
summarized in Table 4.
First, recall from above that we hold constant 
everything except our four environmental settings. 
Hence, the same perceived situation misfits sug-
gested above (i.e., the analyzer with innovation 
strategy) obtains in this complex environment 
also. As above, an analyzer without innovation 
or a defender strategy is suggested as an alterna-
tive solution.
Second, OrgCon recommends that the fittest 
organizational configuration for this scenario is a 
simple organization that has a flat hierarchy with 
a singular head for control and decision making. 
The primary reason for recommending a simple 
configuration is that the organization faces ex-
treme environmental hostility, which requires 
rapid responses to unforeseen challenges. As 
in the simple environment above, the machine 
bureaucracy cannot react quickly when unex-
pected events occur, and is not recommended. 
Interestingly, most CND organizations in DoD 
are Machine Bureaucracies.
Third, OrgCon recommends also that em-
ployees should be loosely supervised with the 
allowance to deviate from standards; therefore, 
the organizational formalization should be low. 
Moreover, the organizational complexity should 
be low since it is recommended that the number 
of job titles should be reduced from very many to 
very few. OrgCon recommends that the managers 
should get involved more in the data collection 
Diagnosis Misfit Recommendation
Perceived Misfits Analyzer with innovation 
Strategy
Defender or
Analyzer without innovation strategy
Configuration Machine Bureaucracy configuration Simple structure configuration
Formalization High formalization Low formalization
Complexity Many job titles Few job titles
Centralization Medium centralization High centralization
Technology Routine, high-volume technology Flexible, adaptable technology
Climate Internal process climate Rational goal or
development climate
Table 4. OrgCon diagnosis of CND organization in complex environment
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and interpretation; therefore, the centralization 
should become high. This appears to be in direct 
conflict with current practice in many DOD like 
and international organizations and offers further 
research opportunities in terms of current private 
and public practice.
Further, CND is in a highly equivocal environ-
ment here, and may not be able to react respon-
sively to changes in the environment due to the 
routine, high-volume nature of its technology. 
This is a vulnerable situation. A highly equivocal 
environment requires rapid adjustment to unpre-
dictable environmental shifts, and calls for more 
flexible and adaptable technology.
In addition, CND’s internal process climate 
is questioned as a misfit, because it may cause 
problems in a high or moderately high equivocal 
environment. An internal process climate focuses 
more on the inside of the organization than on 
the outside. In an equivocal environment, which 
is likely to require change and adaptation, the 
internal process climate may not perceive the 
shifts or understand the need for change, and may 
not support adaptation to such needed change. 
An equivocal environment requires an external 
orientation, which is found in the rational goal 
and development climates.
Clearly, OrgCon diagnoses more misfits with 
the CND organization in the complex environ-
ment than in its simple counterpart, and pro-
duces correspondingly more recommendations 
for organizational transformation. As above, the 
diagnoses are stable, as no additional diagnoses 
result from rerunning OrgCon after making the 
recommended changes, and as above, the organi-
zational leader or manager has an operationalized 
set of steps that can be taken to improve the CND 
organization.
Design requirements
In this section, using the OrgCon recommenda-
tions from above for guidance, we induce a set of 
design requirements for a CND organization to 
perform effectively in both simple and complex 
environmental contexts. The rationale is that our 
grounded CND organization faces both simple 
and complex environments simultaneously; that 
is, much of its time and energy are devoted to 
routine work such as locking out amateur hackers, 
but considerable time and energy are devoted to 
thwarting professional attacks as well. 
Indeed, we draw from the fourth quarter United 
States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-
CERT Quarterly Trend Analysis: Cyber Security 
Trends, Metrics, and Security Indicators, 2007) 
data summarized in Figure 2 to estimate that 
only 16% of hacker/cracker attempts conform to 
attacks by amateur hackers; the remaining 84% 
require more extensive organizational responses. 
Thus, we need to specify requirements for a CND 
organization that can respond simultaneously 
to both simple and complex environments. We 
draw from Tables 3 and 4 above, and integrate 
the corresponding OrgCon diagnoses and recom-
mendations, to induce such organization design 
requirements. Clearly, because CND organiza-
tions are conservative by default, the integrated 
organization will tend to reflect the complex-
environment recommendations summarized in 
Table 4 for the most part, but the organization 
Figure 2. Distribution of incidents and responses 
(adapted from US-CERT, 2007)
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must be efficient as well, and be able to handle 
routine hacker attempts as such.
In particular, in a complex environment the 
flat hierarchy with a singular head for control 
and decision making is suggested, because the 
organization operates—most of the time—in 
an extremely hostile environment, one which 
requires consistently rapid responses to unfore-
seen challenges. Alternatively, in a simple envi-
ronment a functional configuration is proposed, 
because the equivocality of CND’s environment 
is not high—at many times—the environmental 
complexity is low, not highly uncertain, and the 
organization needs to operate efficiently in these 
simple hacking cases. Combining these two 
results, an integrated approach could include a 
functional configuration but with a singular head 
for control and decision making. Where threats 
are deemed low, the CND organization can rely 
upon its functional groups and procedures to 
address amateur attacks, but where threats are 
high, the leader can still seize control, and take 
quick actions. The remaining requirements stem 
directly from recommendations summarized for 
the complex environment in Table 4.
Preliminary transformation Plan
Based upon the integrated recommendations 
above, our CND organization needs to address its 
strategy (i.e., analyzer with innovation), configu-
ration (i.e., Machine Bureaucracy), formalization 
(i.e., high), technology (i.e., routine, high-vol-
ume), climate (i.e., internal process), complexity 
(i.e., many job titles) and centralization (i.e., 
medium). This represents organizational change 
of considerable scope, and it will be difficult to 
effect all aspects of such change either quickly 
or simultaneously. This is the case in particular 
for the conservative, highly proceduralized, DoD 
Machine Bureaucracy. Additionally, because all of 
the various organizational design elements need to 
fit together—at the same time—it is highly likely 
that some changing elements will have to move 
out of fit as others wait for their times to change. 
This will leave the CND organization in multiple 
stages of misfit as the leaders and managers work 
to maneuver it into better overall fit through time. 
Therefore we are not describing an easy transfor-
mation by any means. Nonetheless, the alternative 
is to accept the status quo: considerable misfit and 
hence vulnerability. We outline the transformation 
plan in three, discrete steps.
Step 1: Management Changes. The easiest 
organizational design changes for manage-
ment to effect pertain to management itself. 
Addressing the strategy is something that 
management can do directly, and adopting a 
Defender strategy would represent a natural 
progression for a conservative organization 
seeking to respond to an increasingly com-
plex environment. 
Additionally, management has considerable 
discretion to re-organize into a functional con-
figuration, simply by revising the organization 
chart, and shifting people’s roles, responsibilities 
and reporting relationships. Since our grounded 
CND organization has a relatively small number 
of people, this should not impact its operations 
or performance greatly. New, fewer job titles will 
be required—for jobs that reflect less formaliza-
tion—and current jobs can be combined to effect 
this change. This can all take place via written 
documentation. 
Further, along with such re-organization, 
management can impose stricter policy regarding 
centralization of information flows and decision 
making. This will enable the organization to 
address the complex environment depicted in 
part by the professional hacker attacks. Where 
the simple environment depicted in part by the 
amateur hacker attacks obtains, management can 
delegate the organizational response via SOPs. 
These changes will prepare the organization to 
pursue the next steps.
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Step 2: Training and practice. Myriad orga-
nizational changes fail to meet objectives, 
because people are not given adequate 
training and practice to perform well in 
different organizational conditions. It is 
one thing to tell people that they will be 
organized differently, that they will have 
new and fewer, less-formalized job titles, 
and that they will need to adhere to stricter 
centralization requirements than before; it 
is another for the people in an organization 
to adjust to such changes. They need to be 
trained, and they need to practice. Clearly 
trial-and-error, on-the-job “training” will 
provide much of the training and practice 
necessary, but this approach is both time-
consuming and error-prone. Management 
should seek out professional help with 
training and practice, and institute fallback 
procedures for responding to attacks that 
exceed the CND organization’s capabilities 
while in transition.
Step 3: Climate. The third step involves the 
most difficult changes: moving to flexible 
and adaptable technology, and changing to 
a rational goal or developmental climate. 
Technological change can be expensive and 
time-consuming, and each new technol-
ogy introduced into an organization tends 
to both disrupt its current operations and 
require modifications to jobs. Hence tech-
nological change will impart feedback on 
the steps above, and the organization will 
need to iterate repeatedly through these 
steps. Such repeated, impacted iteration is 
challenging. 
Moreover, climate change involves culture: 
long and widely understood to be one of the most 
difficult aspects of an organization to alter. New 
managers and/or new employees may be required 
to accomplish this well, and any cultural change 
will need to be endorsed by the organizations 
superior to our grounded CND unit, but training 
and practice can help here too. As above, man-
agement will need a fallback plan to address the 
likely cases of slow or stalled climate change, in 
addition to the repeated disruptions caused by 
new technology introductions.
In the end, management will have to assess 
whether the problems associated with its current 
CND organizational misfits outweigh the prob-
lems stemming from organizational change of the 
magnitude outlined in the three steps above. Per-
haps a devastating, professional hacker attack will 
suffice to convince even the least change-oriented 
managers, but this would represent an expensive 
and hazardous way to learn. Counseling on how to 
convince reluctant managers is beyond the scope 
of this article, but outlining the three-step path 
to CND organizational transformation provides 
such managers with a plan to consider, and with 
a path to follow. This provides new knowledge to 
the CND organization manager, and can be used 
to generate new research questions for other CND 
researchers to investigate.   
DiscUssiOn & cOnclUsiOn
The US Government is moving apace to develop 
doctrines and capabilities that will allow the DoD 
to exploit Cyberspace for military advantage, and 
the role of CNO has taken on greater importance 
with the rise of network-centric warfare. Com-
prised primarily of defense, attack and exploita-
tion, the technological capabilities are growing 
exponentially, as is the rate of data exchange. 
Unfortunately, many extant CNO organizations 
are slow to anticipate and react, and as such do not 
operate well within their highly dynamic environ-
ments, nor are they suited well to the missions and 
expectations placed upon them today. 
A half century of Contingency Theory research 
provides considerable knowledge to guide design-
ing organizational structures that fit well with 
various mission-environmental contexts, and as 
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such it offers excellent potential to inform leaders 
and policy makers regarding how to bring their 
CNO organizations and approaches into better 
fit, and hence to improve performance. The key 
research question is, which organizational con-
figurations provide the best CNO performance 
within the network-centric environment?
In this chapter, we review key background 
literature on CNO, and describe a current CNO 
organization. Focusing in particular on Computer 
Network Defense to ground our model in current 
practice, we discover how CND represents a very 
practical point to begin an investigation with the 
following premise: there is little opportunity for 
an organization with a specific network infra-
structure to conduct computer attacks over time 
if its own defenses are weak.  
We also describe the Organizational Consul-
tant expert system that drives our analysis of such 
grounded CND organization, and note how this 
scholarship-based expert system’s knowledge-
base is supported by a huge formalization and 
integration of the Contingency Theory literature. 
Most such formalization is made in terms of re-
search propositions, expressed via If-Then rules, 
which are easily intelligible to people as well as 
machines, and we learn how OrgCon diagnoses 
misfits between organizational structures and 
mission-environmental contexts. 
Further, we use the OrgCon expert system 
environment to represent the structure and behav-
ior of the grounded CND model from above, and 
depict such model in two, contrasting, network-
centric environments: 
1. A relatively simple environment — used to 
characterize one in which largely amateur 
hacker attacks target known network vul-
nerabilities, and which can be countered 
principally via the use of SOPs that exist 
within the organization
2. A relatively complex environment — used 
to characterize one in which largely pro-
fessional hacker attacks target unknown 
network vulnerabilities, and which are much 
less likely to be countered effectively via 
solely SOPs as above. 
Results follow to diagnose three misfits for the 
grounded CND organization in a simple environ-
ment: 1) the analyzer with innovation strategy, 
2) the Machine Bureaucracy configuration, and 
3) high formalization. OrgCon diagnoses these 
same three misfits in a complex environment, in 
addition to four additional ones: 4) routine, high-
volume technology, 5) internal process climate, 
6) many job titles, and 7) medium centraliza-
tion. Such diagnoses enable us to induce a set of 
design requirements for a CND organization to 
perform effectively in both simple and complex 
environmental contexts, understanding that such 
organization must respond to both.  Of course, the 
most costly in terms of time and energy are those 
devoted to thwarting professional attacks. 
This supports our development of a three-step 
transformation plan: 1) management changes, 2) 
training and practice, and 3) climate. Such plan 
constitutes organizational change of considerable 
magnitude—and that presents substantial chal-
lenge—and time to effect well. In the end, man-
agement will have to assess whether the problems 
associated with its current CND organizational 
misfits outweigh the problems stemming from 
organizational change of the magnitude outlined 
via this three-step plan.
Because of our grounded CND model and 
broadly applicable OrgCon expert system, results 
also elucidate important insights into CNO or-
ganization and management more generally. For 
instance, most bureaucratically driven CNO orga-
nizations (e.g., those organized within the DoD) 
are likely to suffer from misfit conditions similar 
to those diagnosed above for our grounded CND 
organization, and hence to benefit from similar 
transformational steps as outlined in response. 
Further, such results are suitable for immedi-
ate policy and operational implementation. For 
instance, DoD policy makers can and should 
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call to assess all current CNO organizations for 
signs of misfits like those diagnosed through this 
study, and consider the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of undertaking change along the 
lines of our three-step plan versus leaving such 
organizations exposed to the risks inherent within 
misfit organizational structures. 
Additionally, our results serve to expand the 
growing empirical basis of Contingency Theory, 
and appear to represent the first such results ap-
plicable specifically to DoD CNO. Such results 
can serve well to guide continued research along 
these lines. For instance, applying OrgCon to as-
sess other, grounded, CND organizations would 
represent a logical next step, and assessing other 
aspects of CNO organizations (e.g., exploitation 
and attack) would follow logically as well. Indeed, 
this research highlights the promise inherent in the 
use of OrgCon to assess myriad DoD organiza-
tions—that is, well beyond the CNO domain—and 
calls for a wealth of applied research along these 
lines to begin. Hence the potential contribution 
of this research has both theoretical application 
and real-world implications, and should appeal 
therefore to both the academic and practitioner/
policy maker communities. 
Further, fieldwork is required to validate the 
model specifications and behaviors described 
above, as well as to apply and evaluate the kinds 
of insights and recommendations generated 
through this research. Such fieldwork can drive 
additional theoretical insight through induction 
as well, which can drive in turn further model 
development, and the subsequent expansion of 
organizational forms, missions and environments 
that can be analyzed and emulated. Laboratory 
research is similar. Indeed, these multiple types 
of research—theoretical, developmental, compu-
tational, field and laboratory—complement one 
another richly. When integrated into a coherent 
research stream, they enable the kind of progres-
sive and cumulative accretion of new knowledge 
that represents a hallmark of science. This rep-
resents a relatively novel approach to generating 
new knowledge in the CND domain, particularly 
as it pertains to the hacker attack response team 
at the group level.
Indeed, the present study provides useful in-
sights regarding organization configuration and 
the attributes of a CND organization, but as with 
all studies, it has limitations that should be taken 
into account. The Organization Consultant is a 
scholarship-based expert system, which draws 
from the contingency theory literature to diag-
nose organizational misfits and to recommend 
transformations. One important limitation to this 
approach is that an organization may have some 
unique attributes that are not reflected well in the 
OrgCon contingency theory knowledgebase. This 
does not appear to be the case in the present study, 
but such limitation is endemic to expert systems, 
and should be considered by future researchers 
addressing research questions along the lines of 
this investigation. 
Additionally, the level of analysis in our study 
is the group. Hence, our results apply most directly 
to group-level CND, and call for caution when 
making any generalizations the organizational or 
the inter-organizational levels of analysis. This 
calls for future research to address different levels 
of analysis explicitly. Also, the CND organization 
examined in our research reflects a medium-size 
organization operating within a DoD environ-
ment, and hence our results may not generalize 
well to either very large or very small organi-
zations outside such environment. Additional 
research along the lines of this investigation are 
called for in this regard as well. Moreover, there 
is clearly substantial room for interpretation of 
OrgCon results, particularly where composing 
a set of organizational design requirements and 
outlining a transformation plan are concerned. The 
requirements and plan described in this chapter 
represent one of many approaches and paths that 
leaders, managers and policy makers can take. 
Nonetheless, they call for action, and serve to fill 
a current void in terms of guidance based upon 
grounded and systematic research.
  
Diagnosing Misfits, Inducing Requirements, and Delineating Transformations
references
Baddelay, A. (2008, April). Systems for Cyber 
Control. Military Information Technology, 
12(3). Retrieved May 15,2008 from http://www.
military-information-technology.com/article.
cfm?DocID=2398
Baligh, H., Burton, R. M., & Obel, B. (1993). 
Creating the Theory for a Usable Organization 
Designing Expert System. Working Paper, Fuqua 
School of Business, Duke University, Durham, 
NC.
Burns, T., & Stalker, G. M. (1961). The Manage-
ment of Innovation. London: Havistock.
Burton, R. M., & Obel, B. (2004). Strategic Or-
ganizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing 
Theory for Application. Third Edition, Boston, 
MA: Kluwer.
Carley, K. M., & Prietula, M. J. (1994). Com-
putational Organization Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Chaiman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
(CJCSI) (2007, Aug 14). Information Assurance 
(IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND). 
Retrieved May 14, 2008 from http://www.dtic.
mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/6510_01.pdf
Computer Security Enhancement Act of 2001. 
(2001, Nov 28). Retrieved May 14, 2008 from 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:1:./
temp/~c107VdS4Gr::
Department of Defense, (2003). Information 
Operations Roadmap (classified). National Se-
curity Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 177. 
Unclassified summary retrieved May 14, 2008 
from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB177/
DoD Directive 3020.26 (2007, Jan 1). Defense 
Continuity Program (DCP). Retrieved May 14, 
2008 from http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/html/302026.htm
DoD Directive 5200.1-R. (Jan 17 1997). Informa-
tion Security Program.  . Retrieved May 14, 2008 
from http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/
pdf/520001r.pdf
DoD. (2004, Jan). IA Strategic Plan Version 
1.1. Retrieved May 14, 2008 from http://www.
defenselink.mil/cio-nii/docs/DoD_IA_Strate-
gic_Plan.pdf
DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) (2003, May 
9). DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy. Retrieved 
May 14, 2008 from http://www.defenselink.mil/
cio-nii/docs/Net-Centric-Data-Strategy-2003-
05-092.pdf
Duncan, R.B. (1979). What is the Right Orga-
nization Structure?.  Organizational Dynamics, 
7(3), 59-79.
Galbraith, J. R. (1973). Designing Complex 
Organizations. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Longman Publishing Co., Inc. 
Harvey, E. (1968, April). Technology and the 
Structure of Organizations.  American Sociology 
Review, 33, 247- 259.
Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture. 
(2008, March). Last Retrieved 5/19/2008 from 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm 
Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. (1978). Organizational 
Strategy, Structure, and Process. New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Mintzberg, H. (1979). The Structuring of Organi-
zations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Mintzberg, H. (1980). Structure in 5’s. A Syn-
thesis of the Research on Organization Design. 
Management Science, 26(3), 322-341.
North American Computational Social and Orga-
nization Sciences (NAACSOS). (2007). Retrieved 
March 13, 2008 from http://www.casos.cs.cmu.
edu/naacsos/
  
Diagnosing Misfits, Inducing Requirements, and Delineating Transformations
Nissen, M. E. (2005, June). A Computational 
Approach to Diagnosing Misfits, Inducing Re-
quirements, and Delineating Transformations for 
Edge Organizations.  Proceedings International 
Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium, McLean, VA. 
Perrow, C. (1967). A Framework for Comparative 
Analysis of Organizations.  American Sociologi-
cal Review, 32, 194-208.
SANS Institute - about SANS. (2008). Retrieved 
May 14, 2008 from http://www.sans.org/about/
sans.php 
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
Strategy to secure Cyberspace (2003, Febru-
ary). Retrieved May 14, 2008 from http://www.
whitehouse.gov/pcipb/
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in Action. 
New York, McGraw-Hill. 
UCSF IT Network Architecture & Security: About 
us.(2008).  Retrieved May 14, 2008 from http://it-
nas.ucsfmedicalcenter.org/about_us/ 
University of Minnesota Office of Information 
Technology Home Page. (2008). Retrieved May 
14, 2008 from http://www1.umn.edu/oit/security/
incident/OIT__12654_REGION1.html
US-CERT: United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team. (2008). Retrieved May 14, 2008 
from http://www.us-cert.gov/ 
US-CERT Quarterly Trend Analysis: Cyber Se-
curity Trends, Metrics, and Security Indicators. 




Diagnosing Misfits, Inducing Requirements, and Delineating Transformations
aPPenDix a: OrGcOn analysis anD recOmmenDatiOns fOr simPle 
enVirOnments
report summary — cnD
Input Data Summary
The description below summarizes and interprets your answers to the questions about your organization 
and its situation. It states your answers concerning the organization’s current configuration, complexity, 
formalization, and centralization. Your responses to the various questions on the contingencies of age, 
size, technology, environment, management style, cultural climate and strategy factors are also given. 
The writeup below summarizes the input data for the analysis. 
• CND has a machine bureaucracy configuration (cf 100).
• CND has a large number of different jobs (cf 100).
• Of the employees at CND 76 to 100 % have an advanced degree or many years of special training 
(cf 100).
• CND has 3 to 5 vertical levels separating top management from the bottom level of the organiza-
tion (cf 100).
• The mean number of vertical levels is 3 to 5 (cf 100).
• CND has 1 or 2 separate geographic locations (cf 100).
• CND’s average distance of these separate units from the organization’s headquarters is less than 
10 miles (cf 100).
• 61 to 90 % of CND’s total workforce is located at these separate units (cf 100).
• Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management (cf 100).
• Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised closely to ensure compliance 
with standards set in the job description (cf 100).
• The employees are allowed to deviate very little from the standards (cf 100).
• 81 to 100 % non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or procedures for 
their job (cf 100).
• The written instructions or procedures given are followed to a very great extent (cf 100).
• Supervisors and middle managers are to a little extent free from rules, procedures, and policies 
when they make decisions (cf 100).
• More than 80 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization are in writing 
(cf 100).
• Top Management is not involved in gathering the information they will use in making decisions 
(cf 100).
• Top management participates in the interpretation of more than 80 % of the information input (cf 
100).
• Top management directly controls 0 to 20 % of the decisions executed (cf 100).
• The typical middle manager has no discretion over establishing his or her budget (cf 100).
• The typical middle manager has some discretion over how his/her unit will be evaluated (cf 
100).
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• The typical middle manager has great discretion over the hiring and firing of personnel (cf 100).
• The typical middle manager has no discretion over personnel rewards - (ie, salary increases and 
promotions) (cf 100).
• The typical middle manager has little discretion over purchasing equipment and supplies (cf 
100).
• The typical middle manager has some discretion over establishing a new project or program (cf 
100).
• The typical middle manager has little discretion over how work exceptions are to be handled (cf 
100).
• CND has 25 employees (cf 100).
• CND’s age is mature (cf 100).
• CND’s ownership status is public (cf 100).
• CND has an undetermined number of different products (cf 100).
• CND has an undetermined number of different markets (cf 100).
• CND only operates in one country (cf 100).
• CND has an undetermined number of different products in the foreign markets (cf 100).
• CND’s major activity is categorized as service (cf 100).
• CND has a standard high-volume service technology (cf 100).
• CND has a medium routine technology (cf 100).
• CND’s technology is somewhat divisible (cf 100).
• CND’s technology dominance is strong (cf 100).
• CND has either planned or already has an advanced information system (cf 100).
• CND’s environment is simple (cf 100).
• The uncertainty of CND’s environment is low (cf 100).
• The equivocality of the organization’s environment is low (cf 100).
• CND’s environment has a low hostility (cf 100). 
• Top management prefers to make policy and general resource allocation decisions (cf 100).
• Top management primarily prefers to make both long-term and short-time decisions (cf 100).
• Top management has a preference for medium detailed information when making decisions (cf 
100).
• Top management has a preference for some proactive actions and some reactive actions (cf 100).
• Top management is risk averse (cf 100).
• Top management has a preference for high control (cf 100).
• CND operates in an industry with an undetermined level of capital requirement (cf 100).
• CND has an undetermined level of product innovation (cf 100).
• CND has a high process innovation (cf 100).
• CND has a high concern for quality (cf 100).
• CND’s price level is undetermined relative to its competitors (cf 100).
• The level of trust is medium (cf 100).
• The level of conflict is medium (cf 100).
• The employee morale is medium (cf 100).
• Rewards are given in a inequitably fashion (cf 100).
• The resistance to change is high (cf 100).
• The leader credibility is high (cf 100).
• The level of scapegoating is medium (cf 100).
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The Size 
The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of employees, adjusted 
for their level of education or technical skills. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization’s size is medium (cf 
50).
More than 75 % of the people employed by CND have a high level of education. Adjustments are 
made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is lower than 500 but greater than 100 and CND 
is categorized as medium. However, for this adjusted number this size does not have a major effect on 
the organizational structure.
The Climate
The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a internal 
process climate (cf 79).
It could also be the that climate is a group (cf 69).
The internal process climate is a formalized and structured place to work. Procedures govern what 
people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and organizers. Maintaining a 
smooth running organization is important. The long-term concerns are stability, predictability, and 
efficiency. Formal rules and policies hold the organization together.
Employees with a medium to low morale is frequently one element of an internal process climate. 
Inequitable rewards in the organization drives the climate towards an internal process climate. High 
resistance to change is normally present in a internal process climate. 
The group climate is characterized as a friendly place to work where people share a lot of themselves. 
It is like an extended family. The leaders, or head of the organization, are considered to be mentors and, 
perhaps even parent figures. The organization is held together by loyalty or tradition. Commitment is 
high. The organization emphasizes the long-term benefit of human resource development with high co-
hesion and morale being important. Success is defined in terms of sensitivity to customers and concern 
for people. The organization places a premium on teamwork, participation, and consensus.
Employees with a medium morale can be one element of group climate. High leader credibility 
characterizes an organization with a group climate.
The Management Style
The level of management’s microinvolvement in decision making is the summary measure of manage-
ment style. Leaders have a low preference for microinvolvement; managers have a high preference for 
microinvolvement. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile has a medium 
preference for microinvolvement (cf 78).
It could also be that your management profile has a high preference (cf 69).
Management has both a short-time and long-term horizon when making decisions, which character-
izes a preference for a medium microinvolvement. Since the management has a preference for medium 
detailed information when making decisions a medium preference for microinvolvement characteriza-
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tion is appropriate. The management of CND has a preference for taking actions on some decisions and 
being reactive toward others. This will lead toward a medium preference for microinvolvement. 
Management is risk averse. This is one of the characteristics of a manager with a high preference 
for microinvolvement. Management has a preference for using control to coordinate activities, which 
leads toward a high preference for microinvolvement.
The Strategy
The organization’s strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer 
without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow Miles and Snow’s typology. Based 
on your answers, the organization has been assigned to a strategy category. This is a statement of the 
current strategy; it is not an analysis of what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization’s strategy is an analyzer 
with innovation strategy (cf 68).
An organization with an analyzer with innovation strategy is an organization that combines the 
strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into the production of a new product or enters a 
new market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an analyzer without innovation, it has 
innovations that run concurrently with the regular production. It has a dual technology core.
For a medium routine technology, CND has some flexibility. It is consistent with an analyzer with 
innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality an analyzer with innovation strategy is a likely 
strategy for CND. With top management preferring a medium level of microinvolvement top manage-
ment wants some influence. This can be obtained via control over current operations. Product innovation 
should be less controlled. The strategy is therefore likely to be analyzer with innovation.
The Current Organizational Characteristics
Based on your answers, the organization’s complexity, formalization, and centralization have been 
calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be recommendations for the 
organization. 
The current organizational complexity is medium (cf 100).
The current horizontal differentiation is high (cf 100).
The current vertical differentiation is low (cf 100).
The current spatial differentiation is medium (cf 100).
The current centralization is medium (cf 100).
The current formalization is high (cf 100).
The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, centralization, and 
complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and does not take missing information 
into account.
Situation Misfits
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of management style, size, 
environment, technology, climate, and strategy. 
The following misfits are present: (cf 100).
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When only few factors in the environment affect CND, the analyzer with innovation strategy may 
not be a suitable one! With only a few environmental factors, there may be limited need for innovation 
and adaptation. There are probably limited opportunities to which to adapt. An analyzer without inno-
vation, or a defender strategy that focuses directly on the few environmental factors and meets market 
needs efficiently will usually yield better results.
When the equivocality of CND’s environment is low, the analyzer with innovation strategy may not 
be a suitable one! With low equivocality, the environment is well known and understood. An innovative 
strategy works best when the environment offers new opportunities for products and services. Here such 
opportunities are limited. However, process innovation, which reduces costs, is appropriate.
CND has an internal process climate. This is a mismatch with analyzer with innovation strategy! An 
internal process climate is internally oriented with a focus on control. Innovation is difficult to achieve 
with this orientation. More flexibility and a more external orientation are desirable for innovation. An 
internal process climate supports better an analyzer without innovation and defender strategy.
Orgcon Recommendations
Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the greatest 
certainty factor from the analyses above OrgCon has derived recommendations for the organization’s 
configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. There are also recommendations for coor-
dination and control, the appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed 
recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided. 
Organizational Configurations
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a functional configu-
ration (cf 44).
A functional organization is an organization with unit grouping by functional specialization (pro-
duction, marketing, etc.).
When the equivocality of CND’s environment is not high, the environmental complexity is low, and 
the environment is not highly uncertain, the configuration should be functional. An organization with 
an internal process climate could have a functional configuration. 
Organizational characteristics
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is medium (cf 63).
Medium size organizations should have medium organizational complexity. CND has a technology 
that is somewhat routine, which implies that the organizational complexity should be medium. When 
the uncertainty of CND’s environment is low, the organizational complexity should neither be very low 
nor very high so that CND will be able to react quickly when the environment changes. Top manage-
ment of CND has a preference for a medium level of microinvolvement, which drives the organizational 
complexity towards medium. Because CND has an advanced information system, organizational com-
plexity can be greater than it could otherwise. 
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is medium (cf 28).
The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is medium (cf 64).
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The recommended degree of formalization is medium (cf 55).
There should be some formalization between the organizational units but less formalization within 
the units due to the high professionalization. Medium size organizations should have medium formal-
ization. Organizations with medium-routine technology should have a medium formalization. Medium 
formalization is consistent with the leadership style when top management’s preference for microin-
volvement is neither very great nor very low. 
The recommended degree of centralization is medium (cf 55).
CND has an analyzer with innovation strategy. Centralization should be medium. There should be 
tight control over current activities and looser control over new ventures. CND is of medium size. Such 
organizations should have medium to high centralization. Medium centralization is recommended when 
top management has neither a great desire nor very little desire for microinvolvement. Because CND 
has an advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could otherwise. An internal 
process climate in the organization requires a medium to high level of centralization. 
CND’s span of control should be moderate (cf 62).
Since CND has some technology routineness, it should have a moderate span of control. 
CND should use media with medium media richness (cf 70).
The information media that CND uses should provide a small amount of information (cf 70).
Incentives should be based on procedures (cf 85).
CND should use planning as means for coordination and control (cf 87).
When the environment of CND has low equivocality, low uncertainty, and low complexity, the in-
formation media need not be rich nor provide a large amount of information. Direct supervision with 
some planning will be appropriate. Incentives can be procedure based and based on implementation of 
the rules of formalization. It is appropriate to see that the rules are followed and implemented.
Organizational Misfits
Organizational misfits compares the recommended organization with the current organization. 
The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100).
Current and prescribed configuration do not match.
Current and prescribed formalization do not match.
More Detailed Recommendations
There are a number of more detailed recommendations (cf 100).
You may consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions are available.
You may consider supervising the employees less closely.
You may consider allowing employees more latitude from standards.
You may consider fewer written job descriptions.
Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written instructions and procedures.
You may give supervisors and middle managers fewer rules and procedures.
You may consider having fewer rules and procedures put in writing.
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aPPenDix b: OrGcOn analysis anD recOmmenDatiOns fOr 
cOmPlex enVirOnments
report summary — cnD
Input Data Summary
The description below summarizes and interprets your answers to the questions about your organization 
and its situation. It states your answers concerning the organization’s current configuration, complexity, 
formalization, and centralization. Your responses to the various questions on the contingencies of age, 
size, technology, environment, management style, cultural climate and strategy factors are also given. 
The writeup below summarizes the input data for the analysis. 
• CND has a machine bureaucracy configuration (cf 100).
• CND has a large number of different jobs (cf 100).
• Of the employees at CND 76 to 100 % have an advanced degree or many years of special training 
(cf 100).
• CND has 3 to 5 vertical levels separating top management from the bottom level of the organiza-
tion (cf 100).
• The mean number of vertical levels is 3 to 5 (cf 100).
• CND has 1 or 2 separate geographic locations (cf 100).
• CND’s average distance of these separate units from the organization’s headquarters is less than 
10 miles (cf 100).
• 61 to 90 % of CND’s total workforce is located at these separate units (cf 100).
• Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management (cf 100).
• Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised closely to ensure compliance 
with standards set in the job description (cf 100).
• The employees are allowed to deviate very little from the standards (cf 100).
• 81 to 100 % non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or procedures for 
their job (cf 100).
• The written instructions or procedures given are followed to a very great extent (cf 100).
• Supervisors and middle managers are to a little extent free from rules, procedures, and policies 
when they make decisions (cf 100).
• More than 80 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization are in writing 
(cf 100).
• Top Management is not involved in gathering the information they will use in making decisions 
(cf 100).
• Top management participates in the interpretation of less than 20 % of the information input (cf 
100).
• Top management directly controls 0 to 20 % of the decisions executed (cf 100).
• The typical middle manager has no discretion over establishing his or her budget (cf 100).
• The typical middle manager has great discretion over how his/her unit will be evaluated (cf 
100).
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• The typical middle manager has great discretion over the hiring and firing of personnel (cf 100).
• The typical middle manager has no discretion over personnel rewards - (ie, salary increases and 
promotions) (cf 100).
• The typical middle manager has little discretion over purchasing equipment and supplies (cf 
100).
• The typical middle manager has some discretion over establishing a new project or program (cf 
100).
• The typical middle manager has little discretion over how work exceptions are to be handled (cf 
100).
• CND has 25 employees (cf 100).
• CND’s age is mature (cf 100).
• CND’s ownership status is public (cf 100).
• CND has an undetermined number of different products (cf 100).
• CND has an undetermined number of different markets (cf 100).
• CND only operates in one country (cf 100).
• CND has an undetermined number of different products in the foreign markets (cf 100).
• CND’s major activity is categorized as service (cf 100).
• CND has a standard high-volume service technology (cf 100).
• CND has a medium routine technology (cf 100).
• CND’s technology is somewhat divisible (cf 100).
• CND’s technology dominance is strong (cf 100).
• CND has either planned or already has an advanced information system (cf 100).
• CND’s environment is complex (cf 100).
• The uncertainty of CND’s environment is high (cf 100).
• The equivocality of the organization’s environment is high (cf 100).
• CND’s environment is extremely hostile (cf 100).
• Top management prefers to make policy and general resource allocation decisions (cf 100).
• Top management primarily prefers to make both long-term and short-time decisions (cf 100).
• Top management has a preference for medium detailed information when making decisions (cf 
100).
• Top management has a preference for some proactive actions and some reactive actions (cf 100).
• Top management is risk averse (cf 100).
• Top management has a preference for high control (cf 100).
• CND operates in an industry with an undetermined level of capital requirement (cf 100).
• CND has an undetermined level of product innovation (cf 100).
• CND has a high process innovation (cf 100).
• CND has a high concern for quality (cf 100).
• CND’s price level is undetermined relative to its competitors (cf 100).
• The level of trust is medium (cf 100).
• The level of conflict is medium (cf 100).
• The employee morale is medium (cf 100).
• Rewards are given in a inequitably fashion (cf 100).
• The resistance to change is high (cf 100).
• The leader credibility is high (cf 100).
• The level of scapegoating is medium (cf 100).
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The Size 
The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of employees, adjusted 
for their level of education or technical skills. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization’s size is medium (cf 
50).
More than 75 % of the people employed by CND have a high level of education. Adjustments are 
made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is lower than 500 but greater than 100 and CND 
is categorized as medium. However, for this adjusted number this size does not have a major effect on 
the organizational structure.
The Climate 
The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a internal 
process climate (cf 79).
It could also be the that climate is a group (cf 69).
The internal process climate is a formalized and structured place to work. Procedures govern what 
people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and organizers. Maintaining a 
smooth running organization is important. The long-term concerns are stability, predictability, and 
efficiency. Formal rules and policies hold the organization together.
Employees with a medium to low morale is frequently one element of an internal process climate. 
Inequitable rewards in the organization drives the climate towards an internal process climate. High 
resistance to change is normally present in a internal process climate. 
The group climate is characterized as a friendly place to work where people share a lot of themselves. 
It is like an extended family. The leaders, or head of the organization, are considered to be mentors and, 
perhaps even parent figures. The organization is held together by loyalty or tradition. Commitment is 
high. The organization emphasizes the long-term benefit of human resource development with high co-
hesion and morale being important. Success is defined in terms of sensitivity to customers and concern 
for people. The organization places a premium on teamwork, participation, and consensus.
Employees with a medium morale can be one element of group climate. High leader credibility 
characterizes an organization with a group climate.
The Management Style
The level of management’s microinvolvement in decision making is the summary measure of manage-
ment style. Leaders have a low preference for microinvolvement; managers have a high preference for 
microinvolvement. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile has a medium 
preference for microinvolvement (cf 78).
It could also be that your management profile has a high preference (cf 69).
Management has both a short-time and long-term horizon when making decisions, which character-
izes a preference for a medium microinvolvement. Since the management has a preference for medium 
detailed information when making decisions a medium preference for microinvolvement characteriza-
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tion is appropriate. The management of CND has a preference for taking actions on some decisions and 
being reactive toward others. This will lead toward a medium preference for microinvolvement. 
Management is risk averse. This is one of the characteristics of a manager with a high preference 
for microinvolvement. Management has a preference for using control to coordinate activities, which 
leads toward a high preference for microinvolvement.
The Strategy
The organization’s strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer 
without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow Miles and Snow’s typology. Based 
on your answers, the organization has been assigned to a strategy category. This is a statement of the 
current strategy; it is not an analysis of what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization’s strategy is an analyzer 
with innovation strategy (cf 68).
An organization with an analyzer with innovation strategy is an organization that combines the 
strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into the production of a new product or enters a 
new market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an analyzer without innovation, it has 
innovations that run concurrently with the regular production. It has a dual technology core.
For a medium routine technology, CND has some flexibility. It is consistent with an analyzer with 
innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality an analyzer with innovation strategy is a likely 
strategy for CND. With top management preferring a medium level of microinvolvement top manage-
ment wants some influence. This can be obtained via control over current operations. Product innovation 
should be less controlled. The strategy is therefore likely to be analyzer with innovation.
The Current Organizational Characteristics
Based on your answers, the organization’s complexity, formalization, and centralization have been 
calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be recommendations for the 
organization. 
The current organizational complexity is medium (cf 100).
The current horizontal differentiation is high (cf 100).
The current vertical differentiation is low (cf 100).
The current spatial differentiation is medium (cf 100).
The current centralization is medium (cf 100).
The current formalization is high (cf 100).
The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, centralization, and 
complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and does not take missing information 
into account.
Situation Misfits
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of management style, size, 
environment, technology, climate, and strategy. 
The following misfits are present: (cf 100).
  
Diagnosing Misfits, Inducing Requirements, and Delineating Transformations
ND is in a highly equivocal environment, but has a mass production technology. CND may not be able 
to react to changes in the environment. This is a vulnerable situation. Most mass production operations 
are very limited in capacity to adapt and make different products. Mass production optimizes on the 
economies of specialization and standardization. A highly equivocal environment requires adjustment 
to the unknown as that environment becomes clearer. The possibility for mismatch of what the existing 
mass production can do and what will be required in the new environment is very high and further the 
economic consequences are likely to be great with low return. A highly equivocal environment calls 
for a more non routine production capability than most mass production operations have.
CND has an internal process climate. This may cause problems in a high or moderately high equivo-
cal environment! An internal process climate focuses more on the inside of the organization than on 
the outside. In an equivocal environment which is likely to require change and adaptation, the internal 
process climate may not either see the shift, understand the need for change and does not have an or-
ganization which supports adaptation to such needed change. There is high resistance to change. An 
equivocal environment requires an external orientation which is found in the rational goal and develop-
ment climates.
CND has an internal process climate. This is a mismatch with analyzer with innovation strategy! An 
internal process climate is internally oriented with a focus on control. Innovation is difficult to achieve 
with this orientation. More flexibility and a more external orientation are desirable for innovation. An 
internal process climate supports better an analyzer without innovation and defender strategy.
OrgCon Recommendations 
Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the greatest 
certainty factor from the analyses above OrgCon has derived recommendations for the organization’s 
configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. There are also recommendations for coor-
dination and control, the appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed 
recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided. 
Organizational Configurations 
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a simple configura-
tion (cf 70).
It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy (cf -100).
A simple organization has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and decision making.
The primary reason for recommending a simple configuration is that the organization has extreme 
environmental hostility. Extreme environmental hostility requires that the organization can respond 
consistently and rapid to unforeseen challenges. Therefore, it must have a simple configuration. 
When the organization is confronted with hostility, it cannot be a machine bureaucracy. A machine 
bureaucracy cannot act appropriately when unexpected events occur.
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Organizational characteristics 
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is low (cf 68).
Not much is known about the environment since both the environmental uncertainty and the en-
vironmental equivocality of CND are high. In this situation, the organizational complexity should be 
low. This allows the organization to adapt quickly. When the environmental hostility of CND is high, 
organizational complexity should be low. 
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low (cf 68).
The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low (cf 84).
The recommended degree of formalization is low (cf 68).
Since the set of variables in the environment that will be important is not known and since it is not 
possible to predict what will happen, no efficient rules and procedures can be developed, which implies 
that CND’s formalization should be low. When environmental hostility is high formalization should 
be low. 
The recommended degree of centralization is high (cf 77).
There is evidence against it should be: low (cf -17).
CND is of medium size. Such organizations should have medium to high centralization. When the 
environment is extremely hostile, top management must take prompt action and centralization must be 
high. Because CND has an advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could 
otherwise. An internal process climate in the organization requires a medium to high level of central-
ization. 
CND’s span of control should be moderate (cf 62).
Since CND has some technology routineness, it should have a moderate span of control. 
CND should use media with high media richness (cf 70).
The information media that CND uses should provide a large amount of information (cf 70).
Incentives should be based on results (cf 70).
CND should use meetings as means for coordination and control (cf 85).
It should also use planning (cf 75).
It should also use rules (cf 75).
When the environment of CND has high equivocality, high uncertainty, and high complexity, coordi-
nation and control should be obtained through integrators and group meetings. The richness of the media 
should be high with a large amount of information. Incentives must be results based.Top management 
should play the central role in coordinating and controlling the activities of the organization as well as 
making strategic and operating decisions.
Top management should make many decisions. However, many individuals should be involved in 
gathering information and implementing those decisions.
Organizational Misfits
Organizational misfits compares the recommended organization with the current organization. 
The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100).
Current and prescribed configuration do not match.
Current and prescribed complexity do not match.
Current and prescribed centralization do not match.
Current and prescribed formalization do not match.
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More Detailed Recommendations 
There are a number of more detailed recommendations (cf 100).
You may consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions are available.
You may consider supervising the employees less closely.
You may consider allowing employees more latitude from standards.
You may consider fewer written job descriptions.
Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written instructions and procedures.
You may give supervisors and middle managers fewer rules and procedures.
You may consider having fewer rules and procedures put in writing.
Top management may consider gathering the information needed for decision making themselves.
Top management may interpret and analyze more information itself.
Top management may control the execution of decisions more actively.
The middle managers may be given less discretion over evaluations.
You may give middle managers less discretion on hiring and firing personnel.
aPPenDix c
complex and simple case Detailed Variables 
Categories Variables Current Case Proposed case- Complex 
Environment




Machine bureaucracy Simple configuration Functional Form
Organizational 
Complexity 
Job Titles Large Number Very Few Large Number
Vertical Levels 3-5 1-2 1-2
Organizational 
Formalization
Job descriptions Opera.employees 
incl. senior managers
Opera. employees and first 
line supervisors
Opera. employees excl senior 
managers
Employee supervision Close Loose Moderately close
Latitude from standards Very Little Large Amount A Moderate Amount
Written instructions 81%-100% 41%-60% 61%-80%
Written procedures followed A very great deal Some Some
Free from rules to make a 
decision
Little A great deal A great deal
Procedures in writing More than 80% 41%-60% 41%-60%
Current 
Centralization
Managerial data collection None A great deal None
Managerial data input 
interpretation
Less than 20% More than 80% Less than 20%
Control of decision execution 0% to 20% More than 80% 0% to 20%
continued on following page
Table 1C.
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Middle manager budget 
establishment
None Little None
Discretion in hiring and firing 
personnel 
Great Some Great
Middle Manager exception 
handling
Great Some Great
New project establishment by 
Middle Managers
Some Little Some
Environment Environmental Complexity Complex Complex Simple
Level of Uncertainty High High Low
Environmental Equivocality High High Low
Competition Extreme Extreme Low
Table 1C. continued
